| Editor's Foreword |
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xi | |
| Preface |
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xv | |
| PART I Fundamental Ideas |
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1 | (38) |
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Four Roles of Political Philosophy |
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1 | (4) |
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Society as a Fair System of Cooperation |
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5 | (3) |
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The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society |
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8 | (2) |
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The Idea of the Basic Structure |
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10 | (2) |
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12 | (2) |
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The Idea of the Original Position |
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14 | (4) |
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The Idea of Free and Equal Persons |
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18 | (6) |
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Relations between the Fundamental Ideas |
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24 | (2) |
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The Idea of Public Justification |
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26 | (3) |
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The Idea of Reflective Equilibrium |
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29 | (3) |
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The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus |
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32 | (7) |
| PART II Principles of Justice |
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39 | (41) |
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39 | (3) |
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Two Principles of Justice |
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42 | (8) |
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The Problem of Distributive Justice |
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50 | (2) |
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The Basic Structure as Subject: First Kind of Reason |
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52 | (3) |
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The Basic Structure as Subject: Second Kind of Reason |
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55 | (2) |
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Who Are the Least Advantaged? |
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57 | (4) |
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The Difference Principle: Its Meaning |
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61 | (5) |
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Objections via Counterexamples |
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66 | (6) |
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Legitimate Expectations, Entitlement, and Desert |
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72 | (2) |
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On Viewing Native Endowments as a Common Asset |
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74 | (3) |
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Summary Comments on Distributive Justice and Desert |
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77 | (3) |
| PART III The Argument from the Original Position |
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80 | (55) |
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The Original Position: The Set-Up |
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80 | (4) |
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The Circumstances of Justice |
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84 | (1) |
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Formal Constraints and the Veil of Ignorance |
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85 | (4) |
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The Idea of Public Reason |
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89 | (5) |
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First Fundamental Comparison |
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94 | (3) |
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The Structure of the Argument and the Maximin Rule |
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97 | (4) |
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The Argument Stressing the Third Condition |
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101 | (3) |
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The Priority of the Basic Liberties |
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104 | (2) |
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An Objection about Aversion to Uncertainty |
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106 | (5) |
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The Equal Basic Liberties Revisited |
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111 | (4) |
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The Argument Stressing the Second Condition |
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115 | (4) |
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Second Fundamental Comparison: Introduction |
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119 | (1) |
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Grounds Falling under Publicity |
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120 | (2) |
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Grounds Falling under Reciprocity |
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122 | (2) |
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Grounds Falling under Stability |
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124 | (2) |
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Grounds against the Principle of Restricted Utility |
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126 | (4) |
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130 | (2) |
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132 | (3) |
| PART IV Institutions of a Just Basic Structure |
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135 | (45) |
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Property-Owning Democracy: Introductory Remarks |
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135 | (3) |
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Some Basic Contrasts between Regimes |
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138 | (2) |
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Ideas of the Good in Justice as Fairness |
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140 | (5) |
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Constitutional versus Procedural Democracy |
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145 | (3) |
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The Fair Value of the Equal Political Liberties |
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148 | (2) |
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Denial of the Fair Value for Other Basic Liberties |
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150 | (3) |
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Political and Comprehensive Liberalism: A Contrast |
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153 | (4) |
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A Note on Head Taxes and the Priority of Liberty |
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157 | (1) |
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Economic Institutions of a Property-Owning Democracy |
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158 | (4) |
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The Family as a Basic Institution |
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162 | (6) |
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The Flexibility of an Index of Primary Goods |
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168 | (8) |
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Addressing Marx's Critique of Liberalism |
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176 | (3) |
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Brief Comments on Leisure Time |
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179 | (1) |
| PART V The Question of Stability |
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180 | (23) |
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The Domain of the Political |
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180 | (4) |
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The Question of Stability |
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184 | (4) |
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Is Justice as Fairness Political in the Wrong Way? |
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188 | (1) |
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How Is Political Liberalism Possible? |
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189 | (3) |
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An Overlapping Consensus Not Utopian |
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192 | (3) |
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A Reasonable Moral Psychology |
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195 | (3) |
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The Good of Political Society |
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198 | (5) |
| Index |
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203 | |