Organizing Democratic Choice Party Representation Over Time
by Budge, Ian; McDonald, Michael; Pennings, Paul; Keman, HansBuy New
Rent Textbook
Rent Digital
Used Textbook
We're Sorry
Sold Out
How Marketplace Works:
- This item is offered by an independent seller and not shipped from our warehouse
 - Item details like edition and cover design may differ from our description; see seller's comments before ordering.
 - Sellers much confirm and ship within two business days; otherwise, the order will be cancelled and refunded.
 - Marketplace purchases cannot be returned to eCampus.com. Contact the seller directly for inquiries; if no response within two days, contact customer service.
 - Additional shipping costs apply to Marketplace purchases. Review shipping costs at checkout.
 
Summary
Comparative Politics is a series for students, teachers, and researchers of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterised by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu (http://www.ecprnet.eu)
The Comparative Politics series is edited by Professor David M. Farrell, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Kenneth Carty, Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia, and Professor Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Institute of Political Science, Philipps University, Marburg.
Table of Contents
| Tables and Figures | p. xiii | 
| Introduction: Representation as Process | p. 1 | 
| Party Convergence and Beyond | |
| Convergence in Context: Simulating Party-Elector Interactions within a Downsian Framework | p. 19 | 
| Overview | p. 19 | 
| The logic of party convergence | p. 20 | 
| Representation through party convergence | p. 23 | 
| Representational consequences of party convergence and divergence compared | p. 26 | 
| Deterministic policy voting | p. 30 | 
| Comparative evidence for policy deterministic voting | p. 33 | 
| Conclusions and overview | p. 40 Appendix: | 
| Party Stability, Voting Cycles, and Convergence: Comparative Evidence | p. 53 | 
| Introduction | p. 53 | 
| Electoral endorsement of parties-how stable? | p. 54 | 
| Cycling, democracy, and convergence | p. 61 | 
| The stability and continuity of political parties: a theoretical inconsistency in the convergence thesis | p. 63 | 
| How far do parties actually converge? Comparative evidence | p. 66 | 
| Summary and overview | p. 70 | 
| Unpacking the Convergence Model | p. 71 | 
| Rationale | p. 71 | 
| Downsian modelling assumptions re-examined | p. 72 | 
| Measuring the connection between popular preferences and public policy: congruence, neutrality, and responsiveness | p. 79 | 
| How parties influence the connection between popular preferences and public policy | p. 84 | 
| Living with non-convergence | p. 86 | 
| Party Divergence: Causes and Consequences | |
| The Dynamics of Divergence: Ideology, Factionalism, and Representation | p. 91 | 
| Parties, policy, and representation | p. 91 | 
| The parties' role: an overview | p. 96 | 
| Patterns of party movement | p. 97 | 
| Explanations of party policy change | p. 98 | 
| Some representational consequences of party policy movement: voter preferences and government intentions | p. 104 | 
| Party policy behaviour: an overview | p. 109 | 
| Representing Voters | |
| Identifying Majority Preferences: Median or Plurality Voter? | p. 113 | 
| Decision-making through representative elections: an overview | p. 113 | 
| Party votes as policy endorsements under the possibility of non-policy voting | p. 115 | 
| Voter majority preferences: which position is the carrier? | p. 119 | 
| Reassessing the median and the mode | p. 122 | 
| Identifying majority preferences: endorsement of the median or of the plurality party voter? | p. 126 | 
| What is the difference? Tracking median versus modal voter positions comparatively and temporally | p. 131 | 
| Reflecting the mode and the median in government | p. 136 | 
| What of the median citizen? | p. 141 | 
| Conclusions | p. 143 | 
| Representation Over Time: Empowering Both Plurality and Median Voter Preferences Through Policy Inertia-A Model and Simulation | p. 145 | 
| Putting it all together | p. 145 | 
| Congruence | p. 147 | 
| The pace of policy change | p. 153 | 
| Implications of slow-paced change | p. 158 | 
| Bringing in comparative evidence | p. 160 | 
| What happens when policy is not left-right and/or uni-dimensional? | p. 167 | 
| Conclusions | p. 169 | 
| Representation and the Pace of Policy Change: A Comparative Over-time Analysis | p. 170 | 
| Do elections direct policy? | p. 171 | 
| Descriptive analysis | p. 172 | 
| Persistence of explainable regime differences | p. 179 | 
| A unified cross-national, cross-temporal model of democratic policy-making | p. 186 | 
| Estimating congruence, neutrality, and responsiveness from the regression relationships | p. 189 | 
| Conclusion | p. 191 | 
| Appendix: Extending the aggregate analysis to defence and foreign policy | p. 193 | 
| Representing Citizens | |
| The Nature of Citizen Preferences: Meaningful and Stable? | p. 199 | 
| Introduction | p. 199 | 
| Elector/citizen preferences: meaningful and stable? | p. 202 | 
| Elector/citizen preferences: uni-dimensional, multi-dimensional or both? | p. 207 | 
| Relating Elector to Voter Preferences | p. 211 | 
| Introduction | p. 211 | 
| Data overview | p. 212 | 
| How well do voters represent electors? (In)congruence and bias | p. 215 | 
| Voter responsiveness to electors | p. 218 | 
| Long-term relationship between elector and voter preferences | p. 221 | 
| Conclusions | p. 225 | 
| Citizen Preferences and Public Policy | p. 226 | 
| Introduction | p. 226 | 
| Party bracketing of electors | p. 228 | 
| Citizen preferences and public policy in eight countries, 1973-95 | p. 229 | 
| Congruence and bias in enacted policy-an overview | p. 242 | 
| A necessary connection? | p. 244 | 
| The Representational Process | |
| Parties Diverge around Electors-but not too much. Policy Responds-but not too fast | p. 251 | 
| Representational processes: an overview | p. 251 | 
| Representing preferences for change | p. 254 | 
| Spatial representations of policy processes: Does our theory fit them all? And what about cyclic majorities and the median? | p. 258 | 
| Does democracy work? Conclusions and overview | p. 262 | 
| Partisan Governments, Centrist Preferences: Resolving the Paradox of Party Representation | p. 263 | 
| Introduction: the paradox | p. 263 | 
| Forming governments, losing votes | p. 264 | 
| Citizens and parties in a nation's left-right space | p. 266 | 
| Policy representation | p. 267 | 
| Formalizing the centrist tendencies | p. 271 | 
| Alternation in government | p. 274 | 
| Conclusions | p. 279 | 
| Representing Representation: A Core Theory for Political Science | p. 281 | 
| Beyond economics and rational choice | p. 281 | 
| Basic considerations for an alternative to economic theorizing | p. 283 | 
| Democratic representation propositionalized | p. 287 | 
| The spatial theory of representation: focus for a science of politics | p. 289 | 
| Bibliography | p. 291 | 
| Index | p. 303 | 
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. | 
An electronic version of this book is available through VitalSource.
This book is viewable on PC, Mac, iPhone, iPad, iPod Touch, and most smartphones.
By purchasing, you will be able to view this book online, as well as download it, for the chosen number of days.
Digital License
You are licensing a digital product for a set duration. Durations are set forth in the product description, with "Lifetime" typically meaning five (5) years of online access and permanent download to a supported device. All licenses are non-transferable.
More details can be found here.
A downloadable version of this book is available through the eCampus Reader or compatible Adobe readers.
Applications are available on iOS, Android, PC, Mac, and Windows Mobile platforms.
Please view the compatibility matrix prior to purchase.
